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Introduction 
Scholarly understanding of Central Asian politics since the collapse of the Soviet Union has 
been dominated by reference to informal politics, practices and institutions. With some 
exceptions (Jones-Luong, 2002), the prevailing wisdom has been that informal rules matter 
(O’Donnell, 2006)  and to ‘make sense of political processes and outcomes in such contexts, 
paying attention to the formal institutions that are typically the focus of political scientists is 
inadequate; in addition—or instead—one must study informal institutions and interactions’ 
(Radnitz, 2011). While informal politics occurs and operates in many different guises, its 
form in Central Asia has been characterised by informal networks of particularistic ties which 
are based on real and fictive kinship bonds that operate outside of formal officially sanctioned 
channels. Such networks have tended to produce forms of patronage, clientelism, corruption 
and bonds of personal loyalty. Typically these informal networks have been labelled ‘clans’ 
(Schatz, 2005; Collins, 2006). In Central Asia formal political institutions have been 
observed as largely ceremonial (Fumagalli, 2007:2). For example, ‘constitutions have been 
written, elections held, parties established and systems of justice developed. In none of these 
countries, however, do these institutions operate as the primary means for conducting 
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political activity’ (Melvin, 2004: 127). The prevalence of informal politics is argued to have a 
corrosive effect on formal institutions (Stefes, 2006), while formal institutions in this post-
Soviet context are often described as a form of ‘virtual politics’ (Wilson, 2005).2  
Nevertheless, formal institutions have continued to persist in Central Asian politics with little 
thought as to why. If  informal institutions and practices are the main arena of political 
contestation, and responsible for the shaping of political outcomes, over and above formal 
institutions such as elections, constitutions and  legal systems, why have the authoritarian 
presidents of the Central Asian Republics persisted with them? What benefits can formal 
institutions provide for the region’s rulers? And how might they contribute to our 
understanding of the relationship between the formal and informal in Central Asia?  
 
It is these principal questions this article intends to address through a case study of Nur Otan 
(Ray of Light Fatherland), the president of Kazakhstan, Nursulstan Nazarbayev’s political 
party. The intention is to explore the role a political party, as a formal institution, can play in 
one of the authoritarian regimes in Central Asia, examine how a political party might interact 
with informal institutions and practices, and consider the implications of the role of political 
parties and their interaction with informal politics on regime stability and dynamics. To 
explore these issues the article utilises a two-part theoretical and conceptual framework. 
Firstly, it utilises the literature on formal and informal politics to examine their interaction in 
the case of Kazakhstan. Existing literature on the interaction between formal and informal 
politics concentrates of how informal politics can strongly affect the operation of democratic 
institutions, or the development of institutions in transitory regimes. Adding to the body of 
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work this article explores the interaction between informal and formal politics in a 
consolidated authoritarian regime. Secondly, it employs the literature on authoritarian 
regimes and formal institutions to theorise the different functions formal institutions, and in 
particular political parties can play in dictatorships. This discourse advocates that there are 
two primary functions political parties perform in authoritarian regimes: elite bargaining and 
mass mobilisation.  
 
This article argues that Nur Otan undertakes a leading role in aiding elite stability vis-à-vis 
the fractious nature of competition between informal elite networks. With few exceptions 
(Jones-Luong, 2002; Ishiyama, 2008), much scholarship on Central Asia has focussed on the 
influence and prevalence of informal politics at the expense of formal politics. This work 
seeks to re-address that balance as well explore more closely how the formal and informal 
interact in the region. It illustrates that rather than the current assumptions that informal 
politics pervade formal institutions in Central Asia (Radnitz, 2011, Collins, 2006), by 
subverting and competing with them, formal institutions can instead act to stabilise the 
disruptive and capricious nature of informal politics and consequently support authoritarian 
regime stability. The extent to which the party can perform this function in the long-term, 
however, remains uncertain.  Nur Otan’s on-going existence is so reliant upon its connection 
to President Nazarbayev that once he departs the political scene the stabilising function Nur 
Otan plays is likely to diminish. Potentially this could create instability and bring the 
informal political factionalism the party envelops into the open.  The case of Nur Otan in 
Kazakhstan reveals that formal institutions do have a role to play in regimes in which it is 
typically understood that power, decision-making and political relations are dominated by 
what is believed to be informal forms of political behaviour (patronage, clanism, clientelism, 
corruption etc). Additionally, the case of Nur Otan muddies the conceptual dichotomy 
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between the formal and informal that exists in political science. Nur Otan’s close relationship 
with its patron, the President of Kazakhstan, illustrates that the dividing line between what we 
understand as formal and informal is not so clear cut. Nur Otan is a party which lacks agency 
from the personalised rule of Nazarbayev and its preeminent position in Kazakh party politics 
stems from the informal preference it receives due to this position. As a party it is difficult to 
untangle its formal public position from the informal preference it receives. Therefore, in the 
case of Nur Otan it is difficult to see conceptually where the formal begins and the informal 
ends. The purpose of this article is not to provide an answer to this. Its aim is more modest 
and that is to reintroduce the study of formal institutions back into scholarship on Central 
Asian politics which in recent years has been dominated by a fixation on informal 
institutions, organisations and relations. However, at the same time, as reflected in the title of 
the article, it recognises formal institutions in Kazakhstan have to be understood in relation to 
the perceived dominance of informal networks, relations and behaviour.  
 
The article proceeds firstly by conceptually unpacking the idea of formal and informal 
institutions, and the different ways in which scholars have proposed they interact. Secondly, 
the article then outlines the distinctiveness of the informal and formal in Kazakhstan and 
Central Asia more generally. Thirdly, the article explores the literature which examines the 
functions a political party and formal institutions more broadly play in dictatorships. Here it 
is argued that Nur Otan provides a modified elite bargaining benefit as it supports 
authoritarian presidential rule through aiding the alleviation of elite instability and generating 
instead cohesion and homogeneity amongst informal elite networks and lower level state 
employees. The fourth section concentrates on Nur Otan’s role in this respect and explores 
the early antecedents of the party, the rise and fragmentation of informal networks, the use of 
Nur Otan to consolidate presidential power in response to political instability through the 
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consolidation of pro-presidential parties and the synthesis between state and party positions, 
and the extent to which this proved successful. Lastly, the article addresses whether Nur Otan 
can contribute to regime durability in the long-term and how this case informs our 
understanding of the relationship between the formal and informal in Kazakhstan and 
beyond. 
 
Distinguishing Informal and Formal Institutions 
How do we best conceptualise, understand and distinguish between formal and informal 
institutions? From a neoinstitutionalist perspective institutions are ‘the rules of the game in a 
society, or more formally, the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction’ 
(North, 1990: 6). Institutions, therefore, structure human interaction whether it is political, 
social or economic. They are typically the rules which guide behaviour and human interaction 
and as such deviation from those rules usually results in some form of sanction. The threat of 
sanctions, therefore, bind individual and collective bodies to the given rules and norms. This 
definition incorporates both formal and informal rules (Helmke and Levitsky, 2006). A 
distinction between formal and informal institutions is usually grounded in the notion of 
official codification. According to Lauth (2004: 69) ‘informal institutions are institutions 
which are not formally codified in official documents (either in constitutions or laws)’. 
Distinct from formal rules ‘they are not officially written down, nor are they enforced by 
legal recognition or the power of the modern state’ (Grzymala-Busse, 2010: 312-13). Lauth’s 
and Grzymala-Busse’s definitions of informal and formal institutions will be applied in this 
article. At the same time it is useful to distinguish between informal institutions and other 
types of informal phenomena as they are not all the same. As Helmke and Levitsky have 
suggested, ‘not all patterned behaviour is rule bound, or rooted in shared expectations about 
others behaviour’ (Helmke and Levitsky, 2006: 6).  Informal institutions appear in varying 
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forms and it is important to dissemble their different manifestations because the different 
forms they take can produce different outcomes vis-à-vis formal institutions. For instance the 
notion of an informal institution has been used in a very general sense to characterize aspects 
of traditional culture, personal networks, clientelism, corruption, clan and mafia 
organizations, civil society, and a wide variety of legislative, judicial, and bureaucratic 
norms’ (Helmke and Levitisky, 2003:7-8). Helmke and Levitsky suggest that such a broad 
conception is unhelpful and that we need to distinguish between informal institutions and 
other informal practice. They observe four phenomena that informal institutions should be 
untangled from: weak institutions, informal behavioural irregularities, informal organisations 
and culture (2006: 6-8). Lauth (2004) on the other hand argues that informal institutions 
appear more specifically as cilentelist structures (which can be divided into three sub-types: 
kinship, mafia and clientelist parties), corruption, threat perception and customary law (11-
22). The informal networks in Kazakhstan which are part of the subject matter of this article 
fall within Lauth’s conception of an informal institution as a clientelist structure. What is 
clear from the above is that informal forms of politics appear in multiple forms, and as a 
consequence are capable of producing varying outcomes in diverse contexts and can interact 




The interaction between formal and informal institutions 
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In recent years scholars have paid significant attention to how formal and informal 
institutions interact (Grzymala-Busse, 2010; Koehler, 2008; Bratton, 2007; Levitsky and 
Way, 2006; Lauth, 2004). Interaction typically occurs in four ways. Firstly, informal 
institutions act to complement formal institutions ‘they exist side-by-side and mutually 
reinforce and support each other’ (Lauth, 2000: 25). For example, Fumagalli has argued that 
a combination of formal and informal institutions accounted for inter-ethnic stability in the 
Southern city of Osh in Kyrgyzstan. Fumagalli proposed that the absence of formal 
institutions in the early 1990s explains why inter-ethnic conflict occurred at that time. Since 
then the institutionalisation of formal institutions, most notably local government positions, 
acted to complement the informal institutions under pinning inter-ethnic relations in the 
region. It is this interaction between the formal and informal which Fumaglli suggests led to 
inter-ethnic stability in a region which had been prone to violence and conflict (Fumagalli, 
2007:24-25). This thesis of course is notably and fully expunged by the outbreak of inter-
ethnic violence in Osh in June 2010. Nevertheless, Osh does provide an example of how the 
formal and informal can complement one another and produce political stability for a period 
of time, but perhaps further study is required to understand why such stability breaks down. 
A further example of a complementary relationship is in some aspects of informal customary 
law. Lauth suggests that folk traditions ‘continue to belong to a type of customary law that 
can even be enforced in non-state or even partially state-controlled tribunals, as one can 
observe in many Western African countries’ (Lauth, 2004: 79). 
 
Secondly, there are accommodating informal institutions. This is when informal institutions 
can be ‘viewed as a “second best” strategy for actors who dislike outcomes generated by the 
formal rules but are unable to change or openly break those rules’ (Levitsky and Way, 2003). 
For example, research has illustrated in the case of Costa Rica that the formal electoral law 
 8 
fails to promote constituency service as deputies are not allowed to stand for re-election. 
Political parties, therefore, informally incentivize their deputies to engage in constituency 
work as deputies are dependent on parties for any future political career outside the 
legislature. (Taylor, 1992:1071-1072). Thirdly, informal institutions are seen to compete with 
formal institutions. Clientalistic and particularistic structures produce a tendency to 
undermine formal institutions. For example, in Egypt, prior to the recent revolution, informal 
institutions were viewed as subverting the democratic electoral process (Koehler, 2008). 
Arguably prior to the 2011 uprising the ‘informal distribution of power determin[ed] the 
fundamental rules of the political game’ and this meant that formal electoral rules were 
manipulated and subverted to serve the interests of the Mubarak regime (Koehler, 2008:976). 
In Central and Eastern Europe it has been acknowledged that corruption and clientelism 
remain the main obstacles for establishing the rule of law, and thus, the consolidation of 
democracy (Guasti and Dobovsek, 2011). Fourthly, informal institutions can take on a 
substitutive role vis-à-vis formal institutions. For instance, in Eastern Europe it has been 
proffered that formal institutions remain weak but informal institutions work to substitute for 
such weaknesses. Political actors may possess desired outcomes which cannot be guaranteed 
through formal institutions. Instead they turn to informal institutions to ensure their preferred 
outcomes are met (Gallina, 2011). 
 
Much of this prior scholarship has focused on the interaction between informal and formal 
institutions in relation to how this interaction impedes democratic consolidation or the 
functioning of formal institutions typically observed as fundamental to democracy. While 
Anna Grzymala-Busse (2010) has sought to analyse the interaction between the informal and 
formal in transitional regimes, few of these works have explored how the interaction between 
formal and informal institutions aid authoritarian regime stability. This account of Nur Otan 
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reveals how formal institutions can stabilise authoritarian rule through mitigating the 
instability to authoritarian leaderships produced by competition between informal networks, 
and as such the interaction in this case is based on a complementary relationship. 
 
Informal and Formal Institutions in Kazakhstan and Central Asia 
Informal and formal institutions interact in all political systems. Indeed clientelism and 
patrimonialism are not limited to non-democractic or transitional regimes (Kitschelt and 
Wilkinson, 2007). Informal norms of behaviour can often subvert formal institutional rules in 
entrenched liberal democracies too. For instance, in advanced democracies, despite women 
‘formally’ possessing an equal opportunity to obtain political office, they are often 
‘informally’ inhibited by the historical dominance of patriarchy (Millet, 1970). It is 
important, therefore, to distinguish the types of informal politics which exist in Central Asia 
and Kazakhstan from the forms which occur in all political systems.  
 
Informal political phenomena in Central Asia has been characterised through the 
notion of ‘clan politics’ (Collins, 2006; Starr, 2006; Schatz, 2005). Clans are organisations 
which are informal networks of particularistic ties which can be based on actual or fictive 
kinship bonds.  These informal networks are understood to be the arena in which real political 
power and decision-making occurs, not the formal institutional realm. According to Kathleen 
Collins, ‘clan politics creates an informal regime, an arrangement of power and rules in 
which clans are the dominant social actors and political players; they transform the political 
system. Clan networks, not formal institutions and elected officials, hold and exercise real 
power’ (Collins, 2006: 3). Clan politics is not particular to Central Asia. As mentioned above, 
these types of informal networks exist in advanced democracies. In the UK for instance we 
could observe numerous political dynasties as manifestations of informal political networks 
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(e.g. the Benn Family). In the United States there are a number of cases of informal family 
networks who through their connections gain privileged access to resources and political 
positions beyond which an ordinary citizen might obtain (Kennedys, Bushes etc.). The 
difference in Central Asia, however, is the extent to which these informal networks penetrate 
and at times displace formal institutional rules and norms. In the US and UK these family 
clans largely abide by the formal institutional rules and accept the loss of political power on 
the basis of those rules. In Central Asia such acceptance and commitment to meaningful 
formal rules is not evident. Consequently, clientelism, patronage and corruption have often 
been the product of the dominance of these informal clan networks in the region to an extent 
which would not be permissible in advanced democracies (even though it does occur in such 
systems from time to time).   
 
Some scholars assert there is an overemphasis on the familial kinship based identity 
of these informal clan networks in Central Asia and that instead they are situated on regional 
identities constructed by the Soviets elites of the1920s and 1930s (Jones Luong, 2002; 
Cummings, 2000). Recent work, however, denotes the delineation along either clan or 
regional lines underestimates the complexity of these networks (Tunçer-Kılavuz, 2009, 
Gulette, 2007, Radnitz, 2005). These informal networks are multifarious they ‘draw on 
various loyalties including ties of family, friendship, work, education, and patron-client 
relationships. They are neither purely regional nor purely clan-based’ (Tunçer-Kılavuz, 
2009:323). Moreover, there is variation across the region (Ilkhamov, 2007) with some 
suggesting that ‘blood ties’ are more evident in Kazakhstan (Schatz, 2005) where as in 
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan ‘lineage identity does not play such an outstanding role... In 
Uzbekistan what are often meant by ‘clans’ are very loose coalitions composed by various 
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types of allegiances, including kinship, friendship, patron–client, client–client partnerships’ 
(Ilkhamov, 2007: 70). 
 
 In the case of Kazakhstan, while some scholars have played up tribal identification 
based on kinship (Schatz, 2005), these informal networks have often been labelled as 
‘lobbying’ or ‘influence’ groups (Satpayev, 1999. 2007; ECPRAST, 2005). This 
characterisation of informal networks illustrates that while some of these networks are based 
on familial tribal kinship bonds (Khlyupin, 1998) what typifies them is their concentration 
around economic interests (Junisbai, 2005, 2010). Dosym Satpayev, a prominent analyst in 
the country, has argued that ‘one reason defines their behaviour, economic interests: only 
economic interests, no tribes, no other factors. The most important factor is economic 
interests’.4  Additionally, in 2007 much of our understanding of how clan politics underpined 
Kazakh politics was blemished when Nazarbayev moved to marginalise his daughter (and 
presumed successor) Dariga Nazarbayeva and her husband Rakhat Aliev from both their 
political and economic interests (see below). What is clear, however, is that these 
particularistic networks through which access to economic and political resources are 
channelled largely underpin the political system and are the main arena for political 
contestation.   
 
Power and decision-making in Central Asia is mostly personalised. Perhaps with the 
exception of Kyrgyzstan post the 2010 revolution, the presidents of the Central Asian 
Republics all lead personalist authoritarian regimes as understood through the Weberian lens 
of non-rational forms of political authority (Weber, 1978). A personalist-authoritarain regime 
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is understood as relying on ‘informal, and sometimes,  quite unstable personal networks – 
sometimes based on kinship, ethnicity or region – within which particularistic favours are 
exchanged for support’ (Geddes, 2003; 53). Islam Karimov in Uzbekistan, Nursultan 
Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan, Gurbanguly Berymukhamyedov in Turkmenistan and Emomalii 
Rahmon in Tajikistan possess the power to assign most public positions, including regional 
governors, law enforcement bodies, courts, the cabinet and usually some members of the 
Senate (except in Turkmenistan where a second chamber was abolished in the constitutional 
amendments of 2008). In turn this power of patronage generates loyalty from state clients and 
other elites as officials are willing to prove their loyalty to the president by undermining 
formal institutions and formal rules in an effort to impress and meet the needs of their 
political patron. The Central Asian presidents are able to rely on personal loyalty and 
extensive patronage networks to influence and foster a political system to suit their personal 
preferences. Consequently, formal institutions such as elections, the courts and constitutions 
are engineered to favour a positive outcome for the incumbent presidents. As Neil Robinson 
has argued when addressing the role of informal politics in the post-communist space, 
‘informal practices such as corruption, clientelism and patronage in post-communist 
polities…and other forms of sub rosa bureaucratic malfeasance can be so important to the 
operation of post-communist political and economic systems that they sometimes crowd out 
formal systems of governance and redistribution and make them meaningless’ (Robinson, 
2007: 1217). A liberal-democratic conception of formal institutions may conclude that their 
operation in the post-Soviet space is meaningless given the dominance of informal politics, 
yet formal institutions are meaningful in other ways for the region’s authoritarian leaders.  
 
In Kazakhstan the personalist system is based on a series of dyadic and interconnected 
patron-client relationships in what has been described by Kazakh political scientist Nurbolat 
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Masanov as a ‘protectorship-client’ system (Masanov, 2000). The relationships are used for 
the ‘bilateral exchange of resources, information, mutual help, services and other 
responsibilities’ (Masanov, 2000). A by-product of the ‘protectorship-client system’ is the 
development of informal networks who engage in competition for access to resources. 
Nazarbayev has acted as the chief mediator and arbitrator in the competition over resources 
by these informal networks (Khlyupin, 2000). Consequently, Nazarbayev resides over a 
political system where personal loyalty is fundamental, access to appointments and resources 
are linked to access to the president, and a repercussion the system is systematic corruption. 
In effect it is the person of the president which is important not the impersonal office of the 
presidency (Borisova, 2005). 
 
Despite scholarship focusing on the role of informal networks and their seeming importance 
in terms of subverting and competing with formal institutions, formal institutions persist in 
the region and are utilised by the region’s authoritarian leaders. Constitutions, legal systems, 
elections, legislatures and political parties all provide a veneer of democratic respectability 
for the region’s presidents even if they are engineered and manipulated by the authorities. For 
example, the constitutions in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have been often been revised and 
amended to suit the political needs of Nazarbayev and Karimov. In 2007, the government of 
Kazakhstan, through the State Commission for Democratic Reforms, recommended the 
constitution was altered to change the two-term limit for the presidency. It was amended so 
there would be no limit to the number of times the first president of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan (Nazarbayev) could stand for re-election (Duvanov, 2007). Elections have been 
used in all of the Central Asian states to illustrate on-going popularity and legitimacy for the 




 So despite power and decision-making being channelled through informal institutions 
and behaviour such as the informal networks (clans) and personal loyalty to the president, the 
rulers of Central Asia still utilise formal institutions, and how they do so, and the benefits 
formal institutions can provide for authoritarian rulers, is discussed below. 
 
Before moving on however, it should be noted that a clear dichotomy between the informal 
and formal is not always apparent, at least not in empirical terms. Jones Luong (2002), for 
example, has argued that regional identities, based on the formal institutional divisions 
constructed by the Soviets, transformed pre-existing informal social and cultural bonds 
‘infusing them with a new social, political and economic meaning’. The Soviet state thus 
created incentives for individuals to shift their social and political identities from pre-existing 
tribal and religious identities to “Soviet-inspired” ones and to personally invest in these 
identities over time’ (Jones Luong, 2002: 63). Evidently the formal and informal can overlap 
and become infused. Similarly, as will be demonstrated, in the case of Nur Otan the 
interaction between formal and informal politics is ambiguous. Indeed rather than being 
undermined and pervaded by informal institutions such as informal networks, and the 
patronage and clientelism which emerge from them, Nur Otan complements informal 
networks by playing a role in stabilising their intractable nature. This in turn has weakened 
threats to Nazarbayev’s personalist rule. The implication of the empirical overlapping of the 
formal and informal is that the conceptual dichotomy is not as clear and elegant as it appears 
on the surface.  
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The Role of Formal Institutions in Authoritarian Regimes 
The idea political parties, and other formal institutions typically associated with democracies 
(e.g. elections), have an important function in relation to providing benefits for authoritarian 
regimes is not new (Magaloni and Kricheli, 2010; Gandhi, 2008; Brownlee, 2007; Gandhi 
and Przeworski, 2006; Geddes, 2006; Lust-Okar, 2005; Pempel, 1990; Wintrobe, 1998). The 
premise of this literature is that formal institutions provide important functions which serve 
the interests of incumbent authoritarian leaders. This body of work has identified a number of 
benefits formal institutions supply for dictators. In particular formal institutions are invested 
with the capability and capacity to proffer greater authoritarian regime stability and 
longevity. Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski make the case that legislatures can be 
crucial for a dictator’s strategy to co-opt and provide policy concessions to opposition elites 
(2006: 3-4). With specific reference to the role of political parties, it has been argued that 
authoritarian regimes which rely on parties to rule last longer than those which do not 
(Geddes, 2006). Beatriz Magaloni and Ruth Kricheli have proposed two broad roles parties 
perform in non-democratic regimes: ‘a bargaining function, whereby the dictator uses the 
party to bargain with the elites and minimise potential threats to their stability; and a 
mobilizing function, whereby dictators use the party machine to mobilize mass support’ 
(2010: 124-126). Inherent within these two broad functions are a number of sub-functions. It 
is not the scope of this article to rehearse and explain all these different functions in-depth, as 
this has been achieved elsewhere (Bader, 2011; Magaloni and Kricheli, 2010 and Geddes 
2006). Nevertheless, it is worth briefly traversing them and outlining not only those relevant 
to Nur Otan, but also how Nur Otan demonstrates an additional role a political party can 
fulfil in light of countering instability generated by competition between informal networks. 
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In relation to elite bargaining and co-option, political parties can serve the interests of 
autocrats as a channel to distribute economic benefits and transfer rents to opposition elites to 
gain their loyalty (Gandhi and Przeworski, 2006). In the case of many authoritarian systems 
rents are given out ‘and the dictator received political support or money payments in turn’ 
(Wintrobe, 1998: 153). Using a political party to distribute rents in this manner between elites 
assists in generating loyalty to the regime and binding in potential challengers. Autocrats can 
also use parties to ‘broaden their appeal by making policy concessions in a direction favoured 
by potential opponents’ (Magaloni and Kricheli, 2010: 126). However, it is often the case that 
the legislature, and thus consequently the ruling party, is not the arena in which policy-
making and more importantly decision-making occurs (Blaydes, 2009). Nur Otan similarly is 
not an institution which truly has the ability to make policy concessions to oppositional elites. 
Power and decision-making lies not with the party and neither with the legislature but with 
the presidential administration. While the presidential administration, and consequently Nur 
Otan, may adopt policy advocated by opposition parties, it is not clear whether this is 
undertaken to co-opt opposition elites or perhaps to broaden the president’s constituency by 
embracing some of the popularist polices of opposition parties such as OSDP-Azat 
(Nationwide Social Democratic Party- Freedom) and Alga (Forward). As one former Akim 
(governor) and opposition leader argued ‘parties do not strictly influence decision-making but 
nowadays the opposition is a leader of public opinion. In terms of affecting public opinion the 
opposition is ahead of the government on this’.6 One further function highlighted in the 
literature is ‘using the ruling party in order to make intertemporal power-sharing deals with 
potential elite opponents’ (Magaloni and Kricheli, 2010: 127). A political party can control 
access to privileged political positions. Therefore, potential challengers are more likely to 
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Almaty, Kazakhstan.  
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support the regime if they gain access to revenue paying positions. Over the long-term this 
binds elites into the regime providing them with a share and stake in power and resources. 
However, the ‘credibility of the power-sharing deal crucially depends on the party’s ability to 
effectively control access to political positions and on the fact that the party can be expected 
to last into the future. A dictator will possess an interest to uphold a system of credible 
power-sharing with his ruling clique to make his life less vulnerable to conspiracies, military 
coups, and violent rebellions’ (Magaloni, 2008: 716). 
 
Under the rubric of building mass support a political party can support an authoritarian 
regime by being the mechanism through which privileges and resources are distributed 
among the wider population. Autocratic rulers look to a dominant party to ‘build mass 
support for themselves and their policies by both delivering benefits and teaching ordinary 
citizens the regime view of the world’ (Geddes, 2006:12). As Magaloni and Kricheli (2010) 
argue ‘when they are well institutionalised ruling parties should be understood as giant 
patronage systems that give citizens a vested interest in the perpetuation of the regime’ (128). 
The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) performed this distributive function 
expertly in dolling out jobs, privileges and luxuries not available to ordinary citizens unless 
they proved loyal and well-connected to the party (Hough and Fainsod, 1980).  A ruler can 
rely on a formal institution to structure and provide cohesion to their patronage networks, 
binding elites to their leadership and fostering loyalty from the wider population. Rulers are 
able to bind both elites and ordinary citizens to the regime by the distribution of rents to those 
who are loyal and by punishing those who withhold their loyalty (Magaloni and Kricheli, 
2010). To this affect a party can evolve as an ‘instrument of punishment’ which can be called 
on to either withdraw benefits and rents or initiate corruption investigations against 
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individuals and organizations that are not proving loyal to the regime.
7
 In order to guarantee 
the loyalty of citizens the regime is required to monitor their activities. Maintaining such 
surveillance necessitates a strong and active party organization which can monitor and 
sanction citizens accordingly. Magaloni and Kricheli also point to the important role parties 
play in ensuring large electoral turnout and votes for the ruler or his party. Ensuring both a 
high electoral turnout and votes for the ruler generates ‘an image of invincibility that works 
to dissuade potential elite challengers’ thus promoting regime stability and longevity 
(Magaloni and Kricheli, 2010: 129). 
 
Does Nur Otan serve any of the functions explored above for the Nazarbayev regime? When 
the party emerged in 2006 some analysts suggested that Nur Otan took as their model 
dominant parties such as the People’s Action Party (PAP) in Singapore or the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI) in Mexico (Grosin, 2006). These parties are typified as ‘dominant 
parties’ due to being ‘so electorally powerful as to render it unlikely to be defeated in the 
foreseeable future’ (Suttner, 2006:278). As Bader has argued when referring to dominant 
parties in the former Soviet space including Nur Otan, they do contribute ‘to the 
marginalization of real and potential opposition, but do not serve as a major channel for the 
career advancement of elites and do not significantly involve the populations of the countries 
(Bader, 2011: 8). However, this does not mean Nur Otan is inconsequential. Rather the party 
does provide a role in relation to the cooption of the opposition and potential challengers to 
the regime, but not necessarily as outlined in the existing literature. While the party has been 
used to solicit elite cooperation and loyalty there is no evidence to suggest that it achieves 
                                                 
7
 I am indebted to Assel Rustemova for introducing this term to me in relation to Nur Otan. Similarly, Magaloni 
and Kricheli (2010) posit the idea of a dominant party being part of a ‘punishment regime’ where a party acts to 
either hand out or withdraw resources on the basis of loyalty to the regime. 
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this through being the channel through which rents and resources are distributed. Conversely, 
there was an example where a local Akim solicited money from local farmers for the right to 
lease land which then directly went to fund the coffers of Nur Otan. Sergei Erin the Akim of 
the Esil raion in the Akmola oblast was found guilty of extorting money from a local farmer 
for the lease of some land. The money was then transferred to the local Nur Otan branch. 
This apparently occurred with other entrepreneurs in the region too (Khabiev, 2011). This is 
revealing as it illustrates that the power to extort and distribute resources lies with local 
authority figures and not the party itself. The distribution of rents does not emerge from the 
party but from the personalised regime as district Akims are appointed by regional Akims who 
are appointed by the president.  
 
The protectorship-client system that exists in Kazakhstan sees elite groups compete for access 
to resources and positions. President Nazarbayev arbitrates and distributes these rents, not the 
party. Instead the role of the party is to play a role in assuaging the instability and fall out 
which was a product of competition between these informal networks. As before, Nur Otan 
does not possess the autonomy or agency to offer policy concessions to opposition elites, and 
similarly the party is not necessarily the arena in which power-sharing deals take place. As 
Bader (2011) has observed, many Nur Otan deputies in parliament previously held low to 
mid level public positions and therefore hardly represent high-level elite officials a ruler may 
be in fear of and who need placating through some power-sharing deal. Rather the party as a 
formal institution exists to institutionalise elite support for the president and to mitigate the 
unstable effects of competition between informal political networks.  
 
Nur Otan does act to mobilise political support, but again how it achieves this diverges from 
the functions identified in the existing literature. The party is part of a ‘giant patronage 
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system’ as envisaged by Magaloni and Kricheli (2010) but there is little evidence to suggest 
the party is the entrance point for ordinary citizens to gain access to privileges and positions. 
Rather access to public positions remains the prerogative of important state officials (such as 
Akims) not the party per say (even if those state figures are members of the party). Rather the 
party possess a far broader role in terms of promoting mass support for the regime. The party 
is instrumental in the legitimisation of Nazarbayev’s power by developing and articulating 
homogeneity of opinion regarding the centrality of his leadership to the prosperity of the 
country. This article does not explore the nature of Nur Otan’s role in terms of mass 
mobilisation, particularly in terms of promoting legitimisation and articulating homogeneity 
of opinion regarding Nazarbayev’s rule as this has been covered elsewhere (Isaacs, 2011: 
130-155). Instead below is an analysis of how Nur Otan emerged as part of a process to 
provide elite stability.  If we understand political stability as ‘the extent that members of 
society restrict themselves to the behaviour patterns that fall within the limits imposed by 
political role expectation’ then elite stability in an authoritarian regime is the extent to which 
both high-level and low level elites remain within the limits and expectations of their role as 
members of the regime and state (Ake, 1975: 273). Deviation from expected norms of 
behaviour by publicly criticising the operation and conduct of the ruler and their regime, can 
amount to a threat to the stability and durability of the authoritarian regime. The sections 
below explore the extent to which the competition between informal networks in the 
personalist-authoritarian regime of Nazarbayev represented a threat to the stability and 
durability of the regime and the role that Nur Otan played in alleviating that threat.  
  
Nur Otan, Informal Networks and the Countering of Elite Instability 
 
Antecedents to Nur Otan 1991-1999 
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A political party which functions among other things to stabilise political elites and co-opt 
and marginalise opposition to an incumbent regime has a long history in Kazakhstan: the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Indeed the dominant experience Kazakhstan 
has to draw upon for developing political parties in the post-Soviet period remains the Soviet 
era Communist Party. Historical institutionalism denotes that prior institutional antecedents 
set the norms and rules which become difficult to diverge from (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992; 
Hall and Taylor, 1996). Given Nur Otan’s dominance of party politics in Kazakhstan, it is 
often viewed as the successor, if not ideologically then organisationally, to the CPSU and 
gives some credence to a historical institutionalist perspective in the case of Kazakhstan.
8
 
There was, however, no straightforward transition from the Soviet era Communist Party of 
Kazakhstan to Nur Otan. Rather the process was protracted and fragmented.  
 
The diminishment of the CPSU’s powers in the late Soviet period saw a power structure 
emerge which was more personalised and based on the newly created position of the 
president rather than the institutionalised party. Similar to events in Russia, after 
independence President Nazarbayev moved quickly to dissolve the Communist Party of 
Kazakhstan, but immediately attempted to form a party out of its rubble which could perhaps 
provide benefits and support his leadership. After the dissolution of the Kazakhstan 
Communist Party in September 1991 the president backed and supported the establishment of 
a reformist Socialist Party of Kazakhstan (SPK, 1992; D’yachenko, Karmazina, and 
Seidumanov, 2000). The party saw a large number of sitting deputies in the Kazakh Supreme 
Soviet switch from the Communist Party to the newly formed SPK (Ayaganov, 
Baimagambetov and Zhumanova, 1994: 14).  The SPK, however, proved unreliable in 
supporting presidential rule and policies. The party consisted of deputies in the Supreme 
                                                 
8
 As of the 2012 parliamentary election Nur Otan holds most of the seats in the Mazhilis with a small proportion 
being held by two other pro-presidential parties) 
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Soviet who had vested interests in state owned enterprises and were anxious of Nazarbayev’s 
economic reform programme which threatened their hold on such interests. Subsequently, in 
1993 the party collectively withdrew its support for Nazarbayev and moved into opposition 
(Isaacs, 2011) using the legislative arena to put a brake on the president’s economic reform 
programme (Olcott, 2002). 
 
With the SPK emerging as centre of opposition a new party emerged around the president: 
the Union of People’s Unity of Kazakhstan (SNEK). Evidently, this party was an effort by 
figures close to the president to establish a distinctive political party which could support and 
serve the interests of Nazarbayev’s policy programme against the opposition centred in the 
Supreme Soviet. The party attracted the interest of government ministers including the 
Deputy Prime Minister Kuanish Sultanov and a number of elites who would go on to have 
important careers in the government and other political institutions such as Marat Tazhin, 
Serge D'yachenko and Kenzhegali Sagadiev (Ayaganov, Baimagambetov and Zhumanova, 
1994: 37; Babak et al, 2004: 175-6). While SNEK won 30 seats (of 177) in the parliamentary 
election of 1994, and were thus the largest party in the parliament, the legislature remained a 
thorn in the side of the president due to their resistance to his reform programme. Arguably, 
SNEK was formed to mitigate the institutional conflict which appeared during this period so 
as to ensure the president could face off opposition from the new parliament (now called the 
Supreme Kenges) (Isaacs, 2010). SNEK, however, did not succeed in tempering legislative 
opposition. Consequently, the president turned to re-draw the constitutional map. He 
dissolved the parliament, strengthened his constitutional powers and established a new 
institutional landscape in the shape of a new bi-cameral parliament (the Mazhilis and the 
Senate) and a new presidentially appointed body called the Assembly of Peoples of 
Kazakhstan (ANK); an institution intended to represent all peoples and ethnicities in the 
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country (Konstitutsiia Respubliki Kazakhstan 1995, 2006). During this period of institutional 
change SNEK re-named itself as the Party of People’s Unity of Kazakhstan (PNEK) and 
proved a key vehicle in coalescing political forces around the president in his push for 
stronger constitutional powers in 1995. The party in its program explicitly stated that its 
‘mission is to provide support for the course of reforms conducted by the president of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev’ (Buluktaev, D’yachenko and Karmazina, 
1998). In the parliamentary election of 1995 PNEK obtained 24 (of 67) seats in the more 
slim-lined Mazhilis. PNEK, however, during this period was not a dominant political force. 
There were a number of other parties represented in parliament. Some such as the Democratic 
Party of Kazakhstan and The Party of Revival of Kazakhstan were broadly pro-presidential; 
others such as the Peoples Congress Party were considered a loyal and constructive 
opposition, while others such as the reconstituted Communist Party were a more 
straightforwardly belligerent form of opposition. Doubtlessly PNEK existed to try and 
provide the president with a majority of support in the parliament – which to an extent it did. 
Yet, the party was never an arena where decision-making took place or where real power 
laid. The party was not a direct institutional replacement for the CPSU where elite 
bargaining, career advancement and the distribution of privileges and resources took place. 
PNEK was dissolved in 1999 along with a number of other pro-presidential parties into Otan 
(Fatherland) (D’yachenko, Karmazina, and Seidumanov, 2000: 356-7).  
 
Nur Otan succeeded in the role of being a personalist party, where perhaps SNEK and PNEK 
were less successful, due to the president being in a much stronger position by 1999. By this 
point the president had managed to subdue the legislature (and PNEK and SNEK played a 
role in this), win presidential elections (in 1999 and 2005) and gain more political control 
over the periphery by appointing national elites to provincial positions (Cummings, 2005). 
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Therefore, by 1999 a context emerged in which a personalist party dedicated to the policies 
and preferences of the incumbent leader could gain a hold of the elite and the wider state 
apparatus, and acquire the support of the public due to the strength of the president’s position.  
 
As discussed above, the post-95 period saw the extensive personalisation of the political 
system based around Nazarbayev. The concentration of powers gave the president greater 
control of appointments across the political system. State officials were aware they ‘had been 
selected by the president personally and served his political interests’ (Masanov, 2000). 
Emanating from this was the formation of a ‘protectorship-client system gravitating to 
oligarchic forms with a supreme patron on top of the power pyramid, namely the president of 
country’ (Masanov, 2000). This highly personal form of political power proved greatly de-
stabilising as it led to a process of elite fragmentation where some of the informal networks 
which relied on the president’s patronage felt they were being sidelined at the expense of 
those networks which were associated to the president by kinship. Otan and then Nur Otan 
emerged in response to the process of elite fragmentation to mitigate and provide durability 
for Nazarbayev’s authoritarian regime.  
 
Elite Fragmentation 
A consequence of both the construction of a personalist ‘protectorship-client’ system, and the 
privatisation process in Kazakhstan from the mid 1990s onwards, was the emergence of 
influential elite networks competing for access to, and command of, former state enterprises. 
These groups took the form of various ‘influence groups’ which took control of key financial 
and industrial holdings (Satpayev 2007, Junisbai, 2010). Some groups were linked to the 
president by kinship including the group led by the president’s daughter, Dariga 
Nazarbayeva, and her husband Rakhat Aliev while Nazarbayev’s second son-in-law Timur 
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Kulibayev also has his own group. Other groups not connected to the president by kinship 
ties also flourished, most notably the group led by Mukhtar Ablyazov, a former Energy 
Minster, Vladimir Ni, a businessman and close confident of the president who made his 
wealth in light metal mining operations, and the Eurasian National Resource Corporation 
(ENRC) led by Aleksandr Mashkevich, Patokh Chodiev and Alijan Ibragimov (Satpaev, 
2007). These groups were seen as the central political actors in Kazakhstan (Kaernet, H. et al, 
2008; Satpayev 2007; Khlyupin, 1998) and their prominence is explained by weak 
democratic institutions, such as parties, elections and non-elected Akims (Junisbai, 
2010:242).
9
 The importance of these ‘influence groups’ illustrates how ‘informal networks’ 
are viewed as having played a significant role in policy and decision-making, rather than the 
officially sanctioned channels of the government, legislature and political parties.   
 
As these groups emerged Nazarbayev acted to mediate and arbitrate their interests. 
Consequently, some groups not connected to the president by kinship felt marginalised in the 
struggle for former state enterprises. The increasing influence, in particular, of Aliev and 
Kulibayev, saw other groups frustrated by their lack of access to new resources (Junisbai and 
Junisbai, 2005; Junisbai, 2010). According to one senior political figure, it was clear ‘Aliev 
was gaining too much power and accruing too many business interests’.10 This led to several 
waves of elite fragmentation, the outcome of which was that leading members of the 
government and business openly challenged the president creating an atmosphere of regime 
instability. The first wave occurred in 1998 when former prime minister and architect of 
                                                 
9
 This article will not detail in-depth the configurations of these groups and which resources they mange as this 
has been covered expertly elsewhere (Junisbai, 2010; Kaernet, H. et al, 2008) and is not the primary focus of 
this article.  
10
 Interview with senior Ak Zhol official, 18 January 2007, Almaty, Kazakhstan. 
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Kazakhstan’s privatisation programme, Akezhan Kazhegeldin, openly criticised the president 
and moved into opposition. Kazhegeldin lambasted the operation of Nazarbayev’s regime. It 
represented for one leading political analyst in Kazakhstan the first time ‘a high-ranked 
official expressed his ambitions and for the first time made the big politics public’.11 In other 
words, it was the first time the closed politics of informal inter-elite competition became 
public. Despite announcing his political ambitions by establishing a political party, the 
Republican People’s Party of Kazakhstan (RNPK), and proclaiming his intention to run for 
the presidency in 1999 (Olcott, 2002: 119-20), Kazhegeldin found himself discredited by a 
concerted campaign led by the authorities accusing him of tax fraud and money laundering. It 
is claimed that in 1998 a special team was established on the orders of the head of the KNB 
Alnur Musaev, a close associate of Rakhat Aliev, to liquidate the activities of Kazhegeldin 
and investigate his economic interests.
12
 Due to the pressure of the investigation into his 
financial dealings Kazhegeldin left Kazakhstan and moved into exile, firstly in Moscow and 
then Europe. In September 2001 he was convicted in absentia and sentenced to ten years. The 
RNPK have always maintained the charges were politically motivated (RNPK, 2001). 
 
The most notable wave of elite fragmentation was the emergence of the Democratic Choice 
of Kazakhstan (DCK), an association of leading business (including Ablyazov and 
Galymzhan Zhakiianov, Akim of Pavlodar Oblast) and government elites (including many 
senior ministers) who came out in opposition to the increasing influence of members of 
Nazarbayev’s family in 2001 (Chebotarev, 2006). This article is not the place to discuss in-
depth the events of 2001 as they have been dealt with elsewhere (Junisbai and Junisbai, 2005; 
                                                 
11
 Interview with Yevgenni Zhovtis, Director of Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and the 
Rule of Law, 29 January 2007, Almaty, Kazakhstan 
12
 Taszhargan, June 28 2007. 
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Chebotarev, 2006).The conflict between the groups began intensifying as Aliev used his 
position as deputy head of the KNB (security services) to take control of some of Ablyazov’s 
business including Turan Alem Bank while managing a portfolio of media assets such as the 
State TV channel Khabar and the newspaper Karavan (Junisbai and Junisbai, 2005: 380). 
One of the leaders of the DVK movement has recalled how ‘Aliev was openly against some 
of the representatives of Kazakhstani business...and began taking over other people’s 
companies’.13 In the view of one Kazakh analyst Aliev ‘managed to concentrate in the hands 
of a significant part of their political, informational, administrative and penal-power 
resources of the State’ (Kadyrov, 2007). DCK, therefore, emerged appealing to the president 
to protect leading elite figures against the arbitrary actions of state enforcement bodies and 
members of his own family (Serdalina, 2001). A number of different political parties 
emerged from the establishment of DCK each representing varied informal networks that 
dispersed from the ruling group and this essentially posed a threat to the political 
homogeneity of the personalist regime Nazarbayev had been constructing since 1995. This 
includes Ak Zhol (Bright Path), Nagiz Ak Zhol (True Bright Path), later called Azat and Alga 
(Forward).  
 
It is possible to see two further waves of fragmentation. The first was in 2004 when 
Zamanbek Nurkadilov a popular figure in the Southern regions of the country, former Akim 
of Almaty and Emergencies Minister openly criticised the president accusing him and his 
family of corrupt practices (Respublika, 2004).
14
 In the same year Zharmakhan Tuyakbai, 
                                                 
13
Interview with Galymzhan Zhakiyanov, Chairman of the Public Foundation ‘Civil Society’, 10 January 2007, 
Almaty, Kazakhstan. 
14
 Nurkadilov joined forces with the opposition party Ak Zhol but in November 2005 he was found dead with 
two gunshot wounds to the chest. The authorities declared it was a case of suicide but many in the opposition 
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deputy leader of Otan (Fatherland), and speaker of the Mazhilis publicly criticised the 
conduct of the elections in 2004 and entered the opposition. Tuyakbai was the opposition’s 
unified candidate for the presidential elections in 2005 under the loose public association For 
a Just Kazakhstan (FJK). The second instance was Rakhat Aliev’s public ousting from 
Nazarbayev’s inner circle. In 2007 Aliev had charges brought against him for his 
involvement in the kidnapping of two senior directors of Nurbank, one of Kazakhstan’s 
leading banks. The president personally ordered the Prosecutor General and the Minster of 
Internal Affairs to conduct ‘a detailed investigation of these criminal charges without regards 
for positions of privilege’.15 Nazarbayev’s decision to cast Aliev out from his political circle 
surprised observers, as the prevailing assumption was that politics in Kazakhstan was about 
‘the family’.16 Instead the president was now insuring his rule at the expense of the political 




Elite fragmentation demonstrates the turbulent nature of the personalised regime that had 
developed in Kazakhstan since independence. Members of the elite dissatisfied by the way 
resources were distributed effectively challenged the rule of the president by making public 
their disaffection and establishing political parties to support their efforts of obtaining public 
office. It was largely in response to this intractable context that Nur Otan emerged providing 
the president with the benefit of greater elite homogeneity and stability. Nur Otan succeed 
where its predecessors failed due to the context of presidential consolidation which had been 
                                                                                                                                                        
argue it was politically motivated, claiming Nurkadilov was about to produce documentary evidence proving 
corruption at the highest levels of the government, including Nazarbayev. See Respublika, 12 March 2004. 
15
 MVD RK: K ugolovnoi otvetstvennosti privlekaetsia Rakhat Aliev, www.zonakz.net, 23 May 2007. 
16
 Interview with NGO official, 2 November 2006, Almaty, Kazakhstan. 
17
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developing since 1995 onwards after the introduction of a constitution granting greater 
executive powers to the presidency and in particular after 1999 when Nazarbayev won the 
presidential election. This highlights the extent to which the party is reliant on the president 
and his power base and that their dominance of the legislature and the party system stems 
directly from this. Consequently, Nur Otan has limited independent agency from the 
president. This is not to render meaningless the role Nur Otan plays for the president in 
particular in relation to countering the elite instability generated by elite fragmentation.  
 
 
 Nur Otan: countering elite instability  
Nur Otan played a role in delivering elite stability in two ways. Firstly, it bound in informal 
networks and minimised the ability of independent actors to compete politically with 
Nazarbayev. Secondly, it has enabled wider homogeneity of the state apparatus as public 
employees were cajoled into joining the party. It paved a way for the majority of state 
employees to be bound and fused with the personalist regime of Nazarbayev. 
 
To counter the instability of elite fragmentation Nazarbayev moved to concentrate his 
political resources and power. This included the concentration of economic resources (the 
State Holding Company Samruk-Kazyna), further institutional amendments (a new law on 
political parties in 2002 and further constitutional amendments in 2007 which ostensibly were 
introduced to give more power to parliament but in effect consolidated power in the 
presidency) and the concentration of political supporters into a single institutional form: the 
political party Nur Otan. Nazarbayev created Otan in 1999, just after his successful re-
election as president. Despite dominating the 1999 and 2004 elections the party and the 
president still had to contend with political parties which represented the interests of other 
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elite groups, most notably Asar (All Together) representing Aliev and Nazarbayeva, the Civil 
Party (GPK) representing the interests of Aleksandr Mashkevich and the ENRC, and 
Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan (DVK)
18
 which represented Ablyazov. Despite both Asar 
and GPK being pro-presidential parties the competition between them and Otan during the 
2004 parliamentary election was intense. The leader of GPK at the time, Azat Peruashev, 
pointed to this competition noting that ‘leaders from the Otan party called me up and said 
“deal with your candidate in the region – he is trying to compete with the Otan candidate’. 
They thought we would support the Otan candidates and not our own’.19The electoral 
competition served as a forum for these elite groups to compete for access to power, which in 
turn increased their ability to access economic resources. Nazarbayeva despite being the 
president’s daughter was viewed as a powerful independent force with her party Asar. She 
often made comments regarding democratic reform, while Aliev himself admitted he was 
angling for the presidency.  
 
 In 2006 Nazarbayev achieved party-political consolidation by forcing through a merger 
between Asar, GPK and Otan, thus creating the super pro-presidential party, Nur Otan. The 
merger was a forced one for some in GPK and Asar; Azat Peruashev stated that he ‘was 
against the mergers, from an emotional point of view, and also from the point of view of how 
                                                 
18
 DVK was an opposition party allegedly funded by Ablyazov. It competed in the 2004 parliamentary election 
in an electoral bloc with the Communist Party. They received only 3.4 per cent of the vote. A few months later 
towards the end of 2004 the party was liquidated by a court in Almaty on the grounds the party was responsible 
for undermining the social harmony, political stability and the national security of the state, due to encouraging 
people to undertake actions of civil disobedience after what they felt were the falsified parliamentary elections 
of 2004. 
19
 Interview with Azat Peruashev, former leader of the GPK and current leader of Ak Zhol, 18 February 2007, 
Almaty, Kazakhstan.  
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the party system in Kazakhstan should develop’.20 Additionally, a senior member of Asar 
noted that ‘the decision was quite difficult to take, but a decision came from the top that said 
the party should be united’.21This move was widely viewed as the ‘minimisation of 
independent political forces’22, in particular with regards to Nazarbayev’s daughter, Dariga, 
who had set up Asar only in 2003.
 23
   
 
Nur Otan was established simultaneous to a change in the constitution which rescinded the 
restriction on state representatives becoming members of political parties. This was an 
important step in binding in lower level elites and bureaucrats. This ensured stability for 
Nazarbayev not just with the high level informal networks which were influential, but also 
with government and state officials. Most important were the local Akims who not only 
became members but also chairmen of the regional branches of the party.
24
 The change in law 
allowed Nazarbayev to officially become leader of the party and consequently ‘all 
officialdom was united under the party’.25 The signal from this legislation was that all state 
employees from government ministers to lower level bureaucrats should become members of 
the party. What has emerged is a relationship of dependency between state employees and the 
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 Interview with Azat Peruashev, former leader of GPK and current leader of Ak Zhol, 18 February 2007, 
Almaty, Kazakhstan. 
21
 Interview with Bektas Mukhamedzhanov Member of Nur Otan Political Council and founding member of 
Asar, February 22, 2007 Almaty, Kazakhstan .  
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  Interview with Marina Sabitova, OSDP Parliamentary Candidate, November 14 2006, Almaty.   
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 After Asar was merged with Nur Otan Nazarbayeva was given the post of Vice President of Nur Otan. 
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party. When candidates are seeking a position within the states' employ there is a notional 
assumption between the applicant and the state institution that if accepting the position they 
will simultaneously join Nur Otan. Therefore, as noted by one analyst ‘chiefly any person 
who holds a position in the government is obliged to become a member of the party’.26 The 
party has become synonymous with civil servants and bureaucracy. Even one Nur Otan 
official noted that ‘one of the ideas behind the party was to give jobs to many who were 
previously employed in the Communist Party’.27 The party’s emergence has acted to 
synchronise the interests of the presidential administration and the state. The view of some 
analysts is that this means ‘in principal Nur Otan is similar to the Communist Party of the 
USSR’.28 However, Nur Otan does not possess the agency that benefited the CPSU. Nur 
Otan might benefit from the forcible encouragement of public officials to join the party when 
taking up their positions, but it is the state, and in particularly the influential Akims who have 
the purview and power to distribute the resources, positions and privilege, not the party. The 
party lacks creditability in terms of independent agency. It is seen as a tool of the state and an 
extension of the presidential administration. The party has no ideology or policy platform 
separate from Nazarbayev. For example, the party’s 2007 election programme is based 
largely on the annual address the president gave earlier that year (Nur Otan, 2007). Hitherto, 
his personality and political outlook is reflected in everything about the party and how it acts. 
 
Two questions arise from the above: is Nazarbayev’s regime more stable vis-à-vis the 
instability caused through the competition between informal networks? And if so, did Nur 
Otan play a role in producing greater stability? It is difficult to prove unambiguously that Nur 
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Interview with Pavel Lobachev, Director of NGO ‘Echo’ Elections and Democracy, Almaty, 14 July 2011.  
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Interview with senior Nur Otan official, 8 May 2007, Almaty, Kazakhstan.  
28Interview with Pavel Lobachev, Director of NGO ‘Echo’ Elections and Democracy, Almaty, 14 July 2011. 
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Otan has played a role in providing stability vis-à-vis the fractious nature of competition 
between informal networks. Nonetheless, by using the party to tie in such high-level informal 
networks and broader groups of state officials, the outcome, at least in domestic terms has 
been a more stable and docile environment for the president. As highlighted above, perhaps 
one of the most influential networks of the late 1990s and early 2000s was the Aliev-
Nazarbayeva group. They have been effectively muzzled, with a large majority of their media 
and financial assets returning under state control and with both having their political 
ambitions of the presidency distinguished. Like Aliev, Mukhtar Ablayzov in 2009 fled abroad 
finding his interests in BTA Bank, the largest bank in Kazakhstan, taken over, forcibly he 
claims, by the state joint-stock company Samruk-Kazyna. An investigation committee of 
Kazakhstan’s Interior Ministry has since indicted Ablayzov in absentia (Trifonov, 2010). 
Since the merger of the GPK into Nur Otan in 2006, analysts suggest Mashkevich has ‘lost 
interest in politics’.29 In 2008 the mining company Kazakhmys, of which it is claimed 
Nazarbayev maintains control, raised its stake in ENRC to 26 per cent with Mashkevich 
reduced to only a 15 per cent stake (Global Witness, 2010). Moreover, Mashkevich has 
consistently had to deny rumours he is moving away from Kazakhstan for good 
(Absalyamov, 2011). Vladimir Ni passed away in 2010. While he was always a close 
confident of the president, working in the presidential administration during the 1990s, his 
wealth and  alleged connections to media assets in the country made him a powerful and 
important figure in his own right (Plakhina and Dashov, 2007). The only senior elite figure 
with their own informal network to have survived the presidential concentration of power is 
Nazarbayev’s second son-in-law, Timur Kulibayev. While Kulbayev retains access to his 
business interests in the energy industry, holds the important position of Chairman of 
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Samruk-Kazyna and has been talked up as the potential successor to Nazarbayev,
30
 some 
analysts believe that ‘in the present circumstances, Nazarbayev does not even trust his own 
family’.31 The implication is that Kulibayev and those associated with him, such as Prime 
Minister Karim Masimov, are not certain of their current favoured position. On one level Nur 
Otan was successful in dissipating the power of some of the powerful informal networks. The 
submergence of Nazarbayeva and Aliev’s party Asar and Mashkevich’s GPK is testament to 
that. Beyond the institutional merger of competing parties Nur Otan role has been limited. It 
was not responsible for the taking back under state management the financial and media 
resources once the preserve of these informal networks. Rather Nur Otan had a more 
important role in soliciting wider elite homogenisation throughout the synchronisation of the 
personalist regime with the state apparatus.   
 
Beyond high-level competition between informal networks Nur Otan has helped stabilise and 
concentrate support for the regime. Due to its synchronisation with the state apparatus, such 
as local administrations, Nur Otan is guaranteed access to financial resources and a 
substantial base for electoral mobilisation. When Nur Otan emerged in 2006 it was claimed 
due to the merger with the other parties it would have a mass membership of over 1 million 
(Ivanov, 2006). Current estimates are much lower, for example, the Central Election 
Commission lists party membership as 607 557.32  Whatever the true figure, due to its close 
association with the state apparatus the party possesses a large base of organisational support 
for electoral mobilisation. It has been implied that public employees and private business, 
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under pressure from the local administration, encourage their subordinates to vote for 
Nazarbayev or Nur Otan in elections. According to Vladimir Kozlov, leader of the opposition 
party Alga, ‘this forced voting was mostly common in the [student] dormitories where there 
was high dependence of the students on the administration…. The same situation was with 
the public employees and employees of those entrepreneurs whose heads are in close 
relationship with the authorities’.33 This organisational capacity was most effective in the 
2007 parliamentary election where Nur Otan won 88.4 per cent of the vote and all seats in the 
Mazhilis and in the 2011 presidential election where the party’s organizational capacity 
helped Nazarbayev achieve 95.5 per cent. Such election results and their preponderance over 
the political system creates both an aura of invincibility and inevitability around 
Nazarbayev’s leadership which only acts to strengthen and stabilise his position and ensure a 
legislative imprimatur for any of his decisions.  
 
The concentration of power, and the role of Nur Otan in that process, has minimised the 
instability of conflict between the informal networks underpinning the political system in 
Kazakhstan. Those actors and their informal group networks who previously were involved 
in an informal competition for resources and power have been marginalised and their political 
instruments, such as political parties dissolved or merged into Nur Otan. The party has been 
an important mechanism for forcing actors to accept the incumbent’s leadership and 
relinquish their own political ambitions. It is difficult for executives to control and direct elite 
behaviour and a political party like Nur Otan can tie elites to the executive in a way that 
informal political groups (clan or regional factions) are not able to do. Furthermore, the case 
of Nur Otan exemplifies how parties as formal institutions can affect regime stability by 
securing and consolidating a wider support base of authoritarian rule through the 
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synchronisation of the party into the state apparatus. This enables the regime to utilise state 
resources and organisational capability to mobilise support through the proxy of a party 
 
 
Conclusion: Nur Otan and Regime Dynamics  
While Nur Otan does not provide the kind of benefits typically associated with dominant 
parties in authoritarian regimes, such as being the channel through which resources are 
distributed to co-opt opposition elites and potential challengers, the party provides a different 
kind of function for Nazarbayev. Nur Otan has acted to pacify the fall out resulting from 
competition between informal networks while also being an instrument for wider elite 
homogeneity through the synchronisation of the party and the state apparatus. The party has 
proved an effective mechanism through which to bind state elites and citizens employed 
within the public sector into the personalist regime of Nazarbayev. By being the party of the 
president, and by being supported by local executives, the regime has been able to rally 
support for the president by marrying peoples' commitment to their positions in the state 
sector to their membership of the party. While the party lacks independent agency (in the 
sense that it does not have policies or preferences separate from the president) this does not 
impinge on its capacity to act as this channel for providing support and stability for the 
regime among elites and workers in the state apparatus. This illustrates that in this case 
political parties have an important role to play even if we do not consider them genuine 
dominant or hegemonic parties such as the PRI in Mexico or the PAP in Singapore. Parties in 
authoritarian regimes do not necessarily just provide the functions and benefits proscribed in 
the existing literature regarding elite bargaining and cooption, and mass mobilisation. The 
case of Nur Otan has demonstrated they possess a function too in providing elite stability vis-
à-vis informal politics. This is important as it suggests that in Kazakhstan formal institutions 
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do have a role to play in a context in which informal networks, relations and decision-making 
processes are seen to dominate.  
 
Two questions remain outstanding. Can Nur Otan continue to provide elite stability? And 
what does the party tell us about the relationship between formal and informal politics in 
post-Soviet Central Asia? While Geddes has suggested that one party regimes last longer than 
authoritarian regimes which do not use a political party, Nur Otan and the case of Kazakhstan 
are different from many examples of dominant parties in authoritarian regimes. A personalist 
authoritarian regime exists in Kazakhstan in which the party has no agency independent from 
the president. The party was set up to represent the interests, preferences and policies of 
Nazarbayev. It lacks autonomy and this assists in explaining why the party does not provide 
the same benefits and functions of parties in dominant party regimes such as the PAP.  This 
dependency on Nazarbayev for its raison d’être goes some way to addressing the question of 
whether the party can continue to maintain this role in providing elite stability. As long as 
Nazarbayev remains then perhaps so will the party. However, many observers in Kazakhstan 
feel that it is unlikely Nur Otan will survive once Nazarbayev leaves the political scene. The 
belief is that any chance the party has of longevity beyond the Nazarbayev era depends 
entirely on the attitude of the president’s successor.34 This does not address the question of 
whether it could continue to play a role of assisting with elite stability vis-à-vis informal 
politics, and perhaps that is not a question which can be answered definitively. Nonetheless, 
it is evident that party is inextricably tied to Nazarbayev and that once those personalist 
bonds are removed any shred of authority and legitimacy the party has will be deeply 
contested. Likewise the party’s ability to sustain elite stability and cohesion in the upper 
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echelons of the elite and their utility in synchronising the personalist regime with the state 
apparatus will most likely diminish. Citizens and employees within the state sector will feel 
less obliged to take up party membership as the party would no longer be guaranteed its 
preeminent standing given its patron is no longer in a position of power. It illustrates that the 
party’s position and ability to provide elite stability is contingent upon regime dynamics.  
 
This article has illustrated that formal institutions can have an important and perhaps 
meaningful role in Kazakhstan, and that formal institutions are not necessary pervaded or 
circumscribed persistently by informal institutions and organisations as is implied in much of 
the literature on the region. The case of Nur Otan has demonstrated that a formal institution 
can act to stabilise the unstable nature of competition between informal networks. In this case 
informal institutions are not competing with a formal institution, neither are they substituting 
for defects within a formal institution and nor in this case is the relationship between the 
formal and informal an accommodating one. Rather for Nazarbayev’s personalist 
authoritarian regime, Nur Otan as a formal institution complements the informal networks 
which underpin his power by proffering stability when they have tended towards instability. 
However, the informal networks remain important to the president as his authority depends 
on his ability to distribute resources between them, and perhaps explains why even after the 
consolidation of his power some groups continued to prosper, such as Timur Kulibayev’s 
network.  
 
The case of Nur Otan has been revealing in terms of what it can tell us about the nature of 
political parties and formal institutions, and the relationship between the formal and informal, 
in personalist authoritarian regimes. However, the insights it provides are only partial and this 
article is a useful departure point for further comparative research which can widen the scope 
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in examining the role, function and benefits parties can provide rulers in personalist 
authoritarian regimes in the former Soviet space. Moreover, as stated at the beginning of the 
article, the role of Nur Otan in Kazakhstan does bring into question the dichotomy between 
the formal and informal.  The fact that many analysts in Kazakhstan cannot see the party 
surviving beyond the political career of Nazarbayev, emphasises not only the lack of agency 
the party has, but also the extent to which it exists as a separate formal institutional entity 
independent of the personalised power of the president. The usual barometer of defining 
formal institutions is their embodiment of impersonalised rationalism, but in the case of 
Kazakhstan it is clear that while on the surface the party is a formal institution, underneath its 
operation and political success is defined by the personalised power of the president. In 
addition, given the party performs a function to complement elite instability, driven by 
factional informal competition, it only lends itself to heightening the lack of conceptual 
clarity between the formal and informal in this case.  While it might not be the case that there 
is a lack of clarity in all instances of interaction between what we consider formal and 
informal politics, the case of Nur Otan illustrates that we do have to navigate this conceptual 
dichotomy with trepidation and not fall into its elegant and parsimonious trap. Indeed, there 
may be value in political scientists re-visiting our conceptual understanding of what 
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